

What follows takes as its point of departure an issue raised by Professor Yovel in his book, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, namely that within the Kantian architectonic there exists a discordant void "between the history of reason and empirical history"; a disjunction Yovel designates a "historical antinomy."¹ Emerging out of the mutually exclusive yet necessary demands of Kant's theory of time and his account of the history of reason, this antinomy perhaps most clearly exposes the systematic shortcomings of Kant's trenchant dualism. Yovel characterizes this *aporia* in the following terms:

For reason to be a historical principle, it must be embodied in actual time. Yet time, according to Kant's Transcendental aesthetics, is merely a "form of intuition" that cannot apply to reason at all, only to empirical data categorized by the forms of the understanding.²

Inexorably adhering to the "essential ends of reason,"³ Kant advances a formalistic model of philosophy that is strictly patterned on the universality and apodeictic certainty of the mathematical sciences.⁴ For this very reason however, his system is incapable of accounting for the historical development and realization of those very "essential ends" which he claims it pursues. To maintain *a priori* validity his architectonic must "prescribe" a strict division between corporeal and thinking nature.⁵ But although this division provides for an intoxicating degree of clarity and systematic elegance, its thoroughgoing dualism fails to provide a *mediating factor* that could bridge the gap between the empirical history of human individuals and the

¹ Yirmiyahu Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History*, (Princeton: 1980), 21.

² *Ibid.*, 22.

³ The full passage reads: "the ultimate goal of all philosophy is the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*)" *Critique of Pure Reason* tr. N.K. Smith (St Martin's: unabridged edition) A 839.

⁴ A certainty which is due to the fact that the "employment of reason is here *in concreto*" and yet still "*a priori*," that is, it is constructed from an "intuition which is pure", and therefore "infallible, excluding all illusion and error" (A 837).

⁵ "...we take nothing more from experience than is required to *give* us an object of outer or of inner sense. The object of outer sense we obtain through the mere concept of matter (impenetrable, lifeless extension), the object of inner sense through the concept of a thinking being (in the empirical inner representation, 'I think'). As to the rest, in the whole metaphysical treatment of these objects, we must entirely dispense with all empirical principles which profess to add to these concepts any other more special experience" (A 848/B 876).

atemporal realm of pure reason.

This systematic imperfection, however, only points to a more fundamental antinomy within Kant's system, one which I would like to call the *antinomy of the Self*. For in a strictly parallel manner that which transpires on the species level occurs within the "personal" history of the individual moral agent.

In the second critique, Kant locates "man" as "belonging to two worlds." The first is that of the empirical "person belonging to the world of sense"; the second is that of the individual's higher "personality" which "belongs to the intelligible world."⁶ How the finite and temporal character of the empirical "person" is supposed to interface with the atemporal and infinite character of the intelligible "personality" is never addressed by Kant. While this separation enables him to construct a formal model of a reflective self that conforms perhaps to a transcendental psychology, his adherence to the dictates of synthetic *a priori* knowledge precludes an account of the self that would provide for any dynamic agent of individuation whereby one could coherently speak of a moral individual. Thus, precisely what Yovel points out in regard to the historical domain of the species, is equally valid for the life of the factual individual, as he points out when he writes:

Human reason does not have a history independent of Plato, Luther, Newton, or even Robespierre; it is carried out by concrete men and is supposed, in the field of praxis, to affect the organization of the history of reason.⁷

It is precisely to this issue of the nature of the self and self-consciousness that Schelling's first writings were directed. In his essay of 1796, entitled a *Treatise Explicatory of the Idealism in the Science of Knowledge*, he asks the following question of the Critical Philosophy:

I have searched in vain in Kant and among his heirs for an explanation of *self-consciousness*. Nevertheless, his entire philosophy is without support unless he provides us with the *medium* through which the *intelligible* (pure reason, as he calls it) speaks to

⁶ *Critique of Practical Reason*, tr. L.W. Beck, (Macmillan: 3rd edition), 87/90 (hereafter cited as *CPR*).

⁷ Yovel, 21.

the *sensible* (the empirical) (I 421/116).⁸

The medium which Schelling advances to mediate these traditionally disparate realms is time in its guise as the productive imagination. For as we will see, Schelling takes Kant at his word and argues that if time is the form of all intuition, then "everything that is" – including the intelligible – must be "a function of time" (I 462). But the *role* time plays for Schelling is not limited to that of a mere formal condition of knowing. His use of the term "function" in the above statement, -- a term that denotes a variable quantity whose value depends on and varies with that of other quantities, -- points to his demand for a new way of conceiving a *constitutive* time that is capable of accounting for the reciprocal dynamic of the tenses past, present and future, which make up finite, human existence. For Schelling not only claims that time is "the mother of all development (*Entwicklung*)" (I 332). He also claims that it is constitutive of both self-consciousness and individuality as well. Specifically, as he states in his *System of Transcendental Idealism*, the self is nothing other than "time conceived of in activity" (I 465/103), in which time itself is the primary determinant (*Bestimmung*) whose restricting force "constitutes my individuality" (I 483/116).

Just exactly how Schelling backs up such cavalier claims will hopefully soon become clear. For now let us turn to the textual issue of how Kant and Schelling conceive their respective models of the self. But as we do so it is imperative that we keep in mind two sets of terms: first, that of formalism and dynamism, and secondly, that of the self and time *qua* inner sense. For both sets of terms are determinative for what follows.

Although Kant suggests that the purview of philosophy could well be reduced to the one question "What is man?", he nonetheless denies us the very possibility of a *knowledge of our self*. To review, in the *Transcendental Deduction* of his first Critique, Kant seeks to articulate and ground the conditions of possibility of experience in general and of *a priori* synthetic judgments in particular. *A priori* synthetic judgments of fact are informed through two

⁸ *Treatise explicatory of the Idealism in the Science of Knowledge*, trans. T. Pfau (SUNY Press: 1994), 116. All citations of Schelling's works refer to the pagination of the *Sämtliche Werke* (14 vols. Stuttgart and Augsburg: J.G. Cotta'scher Verlag, 1856-61) followed by the pages of the corresponding English translation (when available).

heterogeneous sources: the spatiotemporal forms of pure intuition (space and time) and the despatialized and atemporal pure concepts of the understanding (categories). The *form* of knowledge originates within us, whereas its *matter* is provided from without (the phenomenal). The synthesis of these two elements "in the determinate relation of given representations to an object" (B 137) constitutes proper knowledge of phenomena⁹ and occurs in consciousness. Kant writes:

The unity which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations (A 107).

This formal unity of the subject "precedes . . . all data of intuitions" and "representation of objects," and makes all "modes of knowledge" possible. Kant calls this "pure original unchangeable consciousness . . . transcendental apperception" (A 107), and further explains that "self-consciousness is a transcendental representation" which enjoys a strictly formal, "numerical identity," that is both "inseparable from it and is *a priori* certain" (A 113). Here we encounter the succinct definition of Kant's unity of consciousness which states that the unity of the transcendental ego can only be described in strictly formal terms as one of "numerical identity."¹⁰ The form of number here functions as the center of gravity, as the common point of

⁹ Kant defines synthetic knowledge as consisting "in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an *object* is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is *united*" (B 137). When we examine the capstone of Kant's account of synthetic knowledge, the *schematism* of the concepts of understanding, we will discover the true *figural* nature of these allegedly *determinate relations* that constitute "proper" knowledge.

10. But what does it mean to say that the self enjoys numerical identity? For if we follow Kant's own definition of number *qua* arithmetic, to characterize the grounding principle of unity as one of numerical identity necessitates a grounding of this principle in yet another substratum, namely that of temporality. For according to Kant, numerical identity not only presupposes synthesis but, in order that it be knowable, it also presupposes *time*. As he writes in the *Prolegomena*, "Arithmetic accomplishes its concept of number by the successive addition of units in time". At this point in our discussion, it appears that Kant's choice of the phrase "numerical identity" to characterize the unity of transcendental apperception should point to a developmental substrate of his model that, if made explicit, would seem to introduce an element of temporality and progressive evolution into his allegedly static and atemporal model of the subject. But if his construct of the transcendental self is to justify its claim to objective necessary and determinate knowledge, Kant must deny the possibility of any contingent element *qua* time from influencing his reflective model of the self.

reference, which unites all possible combinations of the manifold of representations. But what does Kant mean when he uses "numerical identity" to define the unity of consciousness?

To address this question, we must now turn to Kant's exposition of number as found in his analysis of the *Table of Categories*. Kant here notes that the concept of a number belongs to the category of totality (B 111), which is the third category of the first class of quantity. Further, the class of quantity belongs along with the class of quality to the *mathematical* categories, as opposed to the *dynamic* categories of relation and modality. The mathematical group is "concerned with objects of intuition, pure as well as empirical," whereas the dynamic group is concerned only with "the existence of these objects" (B 110). In section 10, added to the B version, Kant provides two extended discussions of one class from each of these two groups: from the mathematical class he singles out the category of quantity, and from the dynamic class he focuses on the category of community construed as reciprocity. Yet it is clear from the content of these discussions that Kant attributes systematic import only to the discussion of the former, that is, the mathematic class of quantity.¹¹ As opposed to the dynamic group and the class of quality, Kant sees the class of quantity as providing the "logical criteria of the possibility of knowledge in general," in so far as the three categories of quantity provide for the concepts of *unity*, *truth* and *perfection*, that in turn provide "for the agreement of knowledge with itself" (B 115). The point of this obtuse and transitional paragraph -- for it is the final paragraph before the *Transcendental Deduction* -- emerges from the following excerpt:

Hence it is evident that these logical criteria of the possibility of knowledge in general are the three categories of quantity, in which the unity in the production of the quantum has to be taken as homogeneous throughout; and that these categories are here being transformed so as also to yield connection of *heterogeneous* knowledge in one consciousness, by means of the quality of the knowledge as the principle of the connection (B 115).

¹¹ This priority reflects both Kant's goal of grounding mathematics in his transcendental philosophy, and his conviction that the degree to which a discipline incorporates mathematics determines the degree to which that discipline is a science.

The point of this passage would seem to be that, to prepare the way for his deduction of the transcendental unity of apperception, Kant must somehow *transform* the mathematical class of quantity, such that it can connect or unite *heterogeneous* knowledge, and thereby open up the possibility for the numerical identity of the transcendental ego.

But what of the other extended discussion which occurs in section 10, of the category of *reciprocity and community* from the *dynamic* class of relation? A discussion that immediately precedes that of the mathematical class of quantity? For at first glance would it not seem more appropriate to use this dynamic category of reciprocity and community to account for the relation between heterogeneous quanta of knowledge?

Let us briefly examine what Kant has to say about this category, for what we will find here becomes determinative for Schelling's derivation of *his categories from the very nature of empirical time*. For in Schelling's derivation the first class of categories is and *must be* both dynamic and one of reciprocal interaction. Kant writes regarding this category of community:

Now in a *whole* which is made up of things, a similar combination is being thought; for one thing is not subordinated, as effect, to another, as cause of its existence, but, simultaneously and reciprocally, is co-ordinated with it, as cause of the determination of the other (as, for instance, in a body the parts of which reciprocally attract and repel each other). This is a quite different kind of connection from that which is found in the mere relation of cause and effect (of ground to consequence), for in the latter relation the consequence does not in its turn reciprocally determine the ground, and therefore does not constitute with it a whole (B 112)

With this we now have before us two different frameworks for understanding a notion of identity: the mathematical model of a quantitative totality,¹² and that of a dynamic model of a

¹² Kant: totality as third category: produced by unity and plurality: leads to totalizing reason, totalizing instrumentality. Ethics: Totality=perfection. Schelling: Community as third category: organic intersubjective reason, reason harnessed to serve the whole. Ethics: Community=wholeness. Grounds for theodicy reconceived: Kant's perfection relegates evil to traditional status as privation; Schelling's wholeness allows for evil to be incorporated *as a positive reality* into the Absolute. Cf. Heidegger on Schelling's metaphysics as the only "metaphysics of evil" and the reason why Heidegger described Schelling as "the truly creative and boldest thinker of this whole age of German philosophy. He is that to

reciprocal and developmental whole. The former model brings to mind a mechanism whose constituent members relate one to another according to the linear progression of cause to effect, in which the ground of each member must be sought for in a cause *external* to that member. And because of this causal relation, it cannot be said that the two members taken together constitute a "community," or a "whole." In contrast the later model -- that of dynamic community -- brings to mind the organic connections of a body that provide for the possibility of a simultaneous reciprocity between ground and consequence. Consequently, this dynamic relation of community suggests a different conception of causality that can account for the internal *Selbsttätigkeit* or *self-determination* of an organic whole.

Kant employs the first model of identity to define the formal unity of his transcendental self-consciousness *qua* apperception, and the ramifications of this choice are significant. For in doing so, Kant restricts himself to treating the subject of his inquiry -- the human self as transcendental ego -- as if it consisted of mechanical building blocks, which, because their only possible mode of relating to each other is that of simple causality, can never enjoy an actual unity, but are rather designed to relate to each other as an extensive aggregate, enjoying a merely formal unity.

As we move to consider Kant's treatment of inner sense *qua* time as the connecting agent of heterogeneous knowledge, the limitations of this mechanical model of the self will become evident. Accordingly, we should now keep in mind not our first set of guiding terms -- formalism and dynamism -- but that of self and time, and their possible relation.

* * *

An investigation into what we can know about the human self requires a model of the subject which is simultaneously both the subject and the object of a discourse: it must provide an account of itself as knower in the *same moment* as it is being known. Kant famously denies

such an extent that he drives German Idealism from within right past its own fundamental position" (Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom*, trans. J. Stambaugh (Ohio U. Press, 1985), 4).

the finite subject the possibility of such self-knowledge. Due to his insistence on a reflective model of the self, it is structurally impossible for it to be at once subject and object for itself, and thus impossible for it to know itself in the Kantian sense of perfect knowledge. Consequently, the gap which exists between the subject and its knowledge of the phenomenal world *an sich* persists even in regard to the subject's own knowledge of itself. Constrained by systematic requirements Kant is inevitably led to defend a position which states that *because* the self can know itself only as appearance, it is only capable of a *consciousness* of self, and therefore incapable of knowing itself as the understanding knows this self: as a determinate object of objective cognition. Thus he writes in the second version of the Transcendental Deduction that I "know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself," but "not as I am to the understanding" (B 155).

Obviously, we have a problem here with the unity of Kant's reflective model of the self. In the passage just cited, Kant himself points out that most of these problems are due to his definition of time as the form of inner sense. He thus answers the question of "how I can be an object to myself at all" by drawing a parallel with our inability to "obtain for ourselves a representation of time" (B 156). Apparently the contours of time and the self are so intimately connected that to prove the impossibility of having a representation for the one proves the impossibility of knowing the other. But why is this? How does time fit into Kant's superstructure?

In the *Transcendental Aesthetic* time is defined as a passive *form* of intuition, and *not* as a dynamic, constitutive factor of knowing. Time is thereby homogenized into one, *quantifiable* dimension in which "different times are but parts of one and the same time" (A 31/B 47). As one uniform field, time cannot be a "discursive, or . . . general concept," but must rather be "a pure form of intuition."¹³ As a pure form of intuition, it can only be represented through what that form will contain, and what it can contain according to Kant are nothing but relations

¹³ If we abstract from "the subjective conditions of intuition, . . . time is nothing" (A 34/B 51). Subsistence cannot be attributed to "objects in themselves...apart from their relation to our intuition" (A 36/B 52). Kant defines this character of time as its "*transcendental ideality*" (A 36/B 52).

(A49/B 66-7). Following the formal model of the mathematical categories Kant construes time as similar to number: different times are different only in terms of "the successive addition" or determination of the "homogeneous units" of a selfsame now (A 142/B 182).¹⁴ Time is thereby denied the possibility of quality, that is, of being a *qualitative* agent of change or variation. For "time itself does not change, but rather only something which is in time" (A 41/B 58).¹⁵ Kant also provides a transcendental definition of time that determines what he calls the "*transcendental ideality* of time," whereby he denies time Newton's gift of absolute and objective validity, and instead grants it a merely relative and subjective validity. Consequently, "if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, time is nothing, and cannot be ascribed to the objects in themselves" (A35/B52).

As a form of intuition, time is the "formal *a priori* condition of all appearances whatsoever" (A34/B51). As the form of inner sense, it "cannot be a determination of outer appearance" (A33/B49), for this is the function of *space*. But since all representations, whether they are of inner or outer objects, belong "as determinations of the mind to our inner state" (A 34/B 50), and because time is the form of inner sense, time must somehow ultimately be the gatekeeper of the intuition of all appearances. To account for how inner sense *qua* time translates outer sense, Kant introduces in the *Transcendental Deduction* the "*transcendental synthesis of the imagination*," thereby offering us the possibility of a "*figurative synthesis*" to mediate inner and outer sense.

¹⁴ Kant's systematic account of the relation between time and number is circular. For according to Kant, numerical identity not only presupposes synthesis but, in order that it be knowable, it also presupposes *time*: "Arithmetic accomplishes its concept of number by the successive addition of units in time" (*Prolegomena*, tr. P. Carus (Open Court: 1994) 36). Kant's choice of the phrase "numerical identity" to characterize the unity of transcendental apperception points to a developmental substrate of his model that, if made explicit, would seem to introduce an element of temporality and progressive evolution into his allegedly static and atemporal model of the subject.

¹⁵ And again, like number, time enjoys the essential character of infinitude: "The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is possible only through the limitations of one single time that underlies it. The original representation, *time*, must therefore be given as unlimited" (A 31/B 47; as an infinite, intensive magnitude). As we will see, Schelling inverts Kant's position, and insists that the original representation of time can only be generated if time is *restrictive*, i.e., time is an insurmountable *limit*.

Kant first distinguishes between the "synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition" and the synthesis effected by a "combination through the understanding" (B 151). The latter *synthesis intellectualis* is a "synthesis which is thought in the mere category in respect of the manifold of an intuition in general" (B 151), whereas the former *synthesis speciosa* is a "figurative synthesis." Since this latter synthesis is the result of the *imagination*, in that it is the "productive imagination" that *produces* an intuition of an object for the understanding, Kant names this act of *Ineinsbildung* the "transcendental synthesis of the imagination" (B 151).¹⁶ With this, however, we are faced with the faculty of the understanding, in its role as imagination, appearing to be *simultaneously* capable of both a passive and active mode of operation; a mode of reciprocal activity which, if permitted, would allow for the understanding to *act upon itself* as imagination. As Kant tells us, "[o]wing to the subjective condition" through which it *receives* its task, it "belongs to *sensibility*" and is thus "determinable". But at the same time, "inasmuch as its synthesis is an expression of spontaneity" it is "determinative" (B 151).

Yet to conceive of the understanding, the imagination, *and* the inner sense as somehow all three forming an actual, unified whole qua self, would be mistaken. To believe that we are capable of assuming "a passive relation [of active affection] to ourselves," would "seem to be contradictory", for if such a relation were possible we would be capable of intuiting ourselves, and as we know Kant rules this out as a possibility (B 153). According to Kant, what really occurs within the mechanics of the self in this figurative act is that the imagination does not *affect* itself *qua* synthetic unity of apperception, but rather it *affects* only the separate and now subsidiary mechanism of time *qua* inner sense:¹⁷

The understanding does not . . . find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold, but *produces* it, in that it *affects* that sense (B 155).

With the divorce of inner sense from the synthetic unity of apprehension Kant eludes the

¹⁶ This is therefore a synthesis of the "productive imagination" and not of the "reproductive imagination" (B 152).

¹⁷ "Thus the understanding, under the title of a *transcendental synthesis of imagination*, performs this act upon the *passive* subject, whose *faculty* it is, and we are therefore justified in saying that inner sense is affected thereby. Apperception and its synthetic unity is, indeed, very far from being identical with inner sense" (B 154).

contradiction of a self capable of being simultaneously both active and passive. He instead expels inner sense from the *numerical identity* of apprehension, banishing it to some region beyond the self's unity, and presents a "determinative" faculty of the understanding that produces combinations of the manifold in the "determinable" inner sense, thereby dictating -- as cause to effect -- the form of the combination of the manifold by the understanding's needs. As Kant makes clear: "Apperception and its synthetic unity is, indeed, very far from being identical with inner sense" (B 154). Obviously, inner sense is not included in the "formal identity" of the unity of apperception.

But yet, as we saw above, Kant **does** concede that we are capable of intuiting ourselves, but only as *phenomenon*, as appearance, as an undetermined object. I can intuit myself only to the degree that in *affecting* myself; I "know myself, like other phenomena, only as I appear to myself, [but] not as I am to the understanding" (B 155). Thus just as in the case of his treatment of the productive imagination, -- when Kant was forced to divide the self *qua* synthetic unity of apperception from the mechanism of time *qua* inner sense, -- he must now again separate the understanding from the subject's own awareness of self. According to Kant the *fact* that he exists is more accurately a mere "consciousness of self"; a consciousness only "that I am" (B 157) which, as he points out, is "very far from being a knowledge of the self" (B 158). Yet this internal divorce again leads to further complications in his account of the relation between the understanding and time when he writes that:

I exist as an intelligence which is conscious solely of its power of combination; but in respect of the manifold which it has to combine I am subjected to a limiting condition (entitled inner sense), namely, that this combination can be made intuitable only according to relations of time, which lie entirely outside the concepts of understanding, strictly speaking (B 158f).¹⁸

Here, in apparent divergence from his account of how the understanding *qua* productive

¹⁸ Kant continues: "Such an intelligence, therefore, can know itself only as it appears to itself in respect of an intuition which is not intellectual and cannot be given by the understanding itself, not as it would know itself if its *intuition* were intellectual" (B 159).

imagination *produces* and *determines* the combinations of the manifold, he now argues that the relations of time, "strictly speaking," lie entirely outside the domain of the pure concepts of the understanding. And not only are these relations of time independent of the categories of the understanding, but they in fact constitute the *limiting condition* that prohibits the self from knowing itself *as* a self, and not merely as a "power of combination." Thus whereas the productive imagination was capable of synthesizing the heterogeneous elements of the sensible and the intelligible through its constructive determination of time, it is now, when faced with the representation of the self, somehow incapable of producing the former to explicate the latter. Kant's awareness of himself rests merely on a *representation* that is a *thought*, and not "a determinate mode of intuition" that could produce for him an *object* of knowledge. The divorce between inner sense and the understanding is now repeated in the divorce of Kant from his understanding. For if Kant were capable of knowing Kant as his understanding knows Kant, he would then have to "be an object to myself," and this is no more possible than obtaining "for ourselves a representation of time, which is not an object of outer intuition"(B 156).¹⁹ From this it would appear to follow that whereas I can only have consciousness of, -- that is, I can only be aware of the seemingly indubitable fact that "I exist in time," -- my understanding has the privilege of not only knowing my self better than I do, but of also being capable of determining time itself.²⁰

¹⁹ If Kant were to admit this, we would have Schelling's position that the self is nothing more than time in its activity, i.e., Kant's refusal to grant the possibility of having an inner object for both time and the self point to their inner unity and the reciprocal determination, which *for Schelling*, is constitutive for both.

20. That this position does indeed accurately depict the structure of Kant's subject, can be shown in the way he presents the relation between time and the understanding in his *Doctrine of Judgment*.

As is well known, the goal of this stage of Kant's presentation is to provide an account of how the pure concepts of the understanding are employed *in concreto*. Because the "pure concepts of the understanding" are "quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions" (A 137/B 176), he must somehow account for a mechanism whereby intuitions are subsumed under pure concepts, and categories are applied to appearances. As we all know the mediating mechanism he introduces, "this third thing", is "the *transcendental schema*". He specifies that it "must in one respect be *intellectual*" and yet also "*sensible*" (A 138/B 177), and nominates *time* as the actual agent of mediation. Now determined transcendently, time becomes "the formal condition of...the connection of all representations" (A 138/B 177). And in a sharp departure from what we have previously seen, time is now presented as not only being

"homogeneous" with the understanding, but as being subsumed under the category "which constitutes its unity, in that it is universal and rests upon an *a priori* rule" (A 138/B 178). Inner sense, previously banished from the numerical identity of the unity of apperception, is now, once transcendently determined, readmitted into the fold. (Time transcendently determined however, requires that time be purely intellectual -- cleansed of all subjective sensibility -- but if time so determined, how then can Kant say in the next breath that time "is so far homogeneous with appearance, in that time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold" (A 139/B 178). Far from lying "entirely outside the concepts of understanding," time transcendently determined, now has its "unity" determined by a category of the understanding. Thus time, whose "original representation" had been previously defined as "unlimited" (A 31/B 47), is now *limited* by the understanding *qua* productive imagination through the category which constitutes its unity. As we saw in Kant's description of how *productive imagination* works in *figurative synthesis*, it is the understanding that "determines" the "inner sense" of time and generates a schema, or outline, which in turn should specify (in general) the "formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the employment of the concept of understanding" will apply (A 140/B 179).

Thus does time -- which above constituted a limiting condition for the understanding -- now itself become limited by that very same understanding. Through its offices of transcendental imagination, the understanding determines the form of inner sense, of time, such that it somehow assumes the form of a schema which is capable of facilitating the application of categories to, in the case of pure concepts, a "succession in the manifold." The schemata of the categories, "are thus nothing but *a priori* determinations of time in accordance with rules", that enable a "representation of a determination of time" (A 145/B 184). And ultimately, all the representations of successive determinations of time are united and "connected *a priori* in one concept in conformity with the unity of apperception" (A 142/B 181).

But how does this relate to what Kant has previously said about the relation of time and the understanding regarding the possibility of self-knowledge? That is, that the self is limited to a consciousness "solely of its power of combination", and that the "limiting condition" responsible for this is none other than the "relations of time" *qua* "inner sense", which strictly speaking, "lie entirely outside the concepts of understanding" (B 158f)? Kant's only way out of this apparent contradiction is to appeal to the powers of productive imagination in the guise of the schematism of the understanding. For according to his model of the self, it is this faculty of the understanding that ultimately mediates this paradoxical formulation of time as both ("*strictly speaking*") independent of and yet, ("*figuratively speaking*") determined by the dictates of transcendental apperception. As we have seen, the synthesis of any particular intuition requires a "figurative synthesis" that will unite that *particular* intuition with the *general* concept thought in the category. This "*figurative synthesis*" is "possible and necessary *a priori*" (B 151), and is termed "the *transcendental synthesis of imagination*" (B 151). From this it follows that the *transcendental synthesis of imagination* is also 'possible and necessary *a priori*.' Consequently, it appears that the final condition of the possibility of *a priori* synthetic knowledge is a **figural** synthesis of the transcendental **imagination**. Thus does the capstone of Kant's critical edifice appear to stand in discordant asymmetry to the professed rational and cognitive autonomy of his "transcendental unity of apperception." For the unity afforded by this apperception ultimately appears to be grounded in a schematism which Kant himself characterizes as "an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover" (A 142/B 181). The ground for the unity of consciousness, and therefore of determinate knowledge, would appear on Kant's own account to remain buried in a form of 'art' or creative activity, that somehow involves the interplay of *time* and *imagination* in the *self*, and whose 'real modes of activity' might always be inaccessible to human inquiry.

While in total agreement with the overarching program of Kant's philosophy, Schelling nonetheless found such reflective contortions as we have just encountered to be the sign of a "spiritual sickness" (I 689) suffered by philosophers who through the exclusive use of "mere reflection" (I 689) succeed in completely separating themselves from what Pierce calls the "Outward Clash" of the "firstness" of lived reality.²¹ If one relies on the exclusive use of reflection in their pursuit of knowing, thereby failing to integrate not only the influence, but also the *material import* of intuition in that pursuit, one will according to Schelling always be led, to the separation of the self from itself. Or as he describes the process in his *Philosophy of Nature* - - in terms not unlike what we have just seen with Kant's ability to know himself --: "with that separation, reflection first begins; he separates from now on what Nature had always united, separates the object from the intuition, the concept from the image, [and] finally . . . he separates himself from himself" (I 695).

Kant's overriding concern is to guarantee the universality and validity of synthetic *a priori* judgments -- a position that, since it accepts *a priori* concepts, will of necessity denigrate the certainty and integrity of the empirical realm of existence. In contrast to this approach which simply accepts and begins with ordinary consciousness, Schelling seeks to account for the singular *fact* of our knowledge in general. To pull this off he replaces the problematic distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* with the dialectical interplay of conscious and unconscious mind.²² In his own words, Schelling seeks to account for that "natural and necessary prejudice,"

²¹ *An American Plato*, in *The essential Pierce*, p. 233. Pierce continues to state that the "direct consciousness of hitting and getting hit enters into all cognition and serves to make it mean something real." Pierce provides a highly suggestive account of the role Schelling's thought has played in the development of his own philosophy, in the following excerpt from a letter to William James:

You ask whether I know of anybody but Delboeuf and myself "who have treated the inorganic as a sort of product of the living? This is good. . . my views were probably influenced by Schelling, -- by all stages of Schelling, but especially by the *Philosophie der Natur*. I consider Schelling as enormous; and one thing I admire about him is his freedom from the trammels of system, and his holding himself uncommitted to any previous utterance. In that, he is like a scientific man. If you were to call my philosophy Schellingism transformed in the light of modern physics, I should not take it hard..." (January 28, 1895; in R.B. Perry, *The Thought and Character of William James*, (Boston, 1935) vol. II, 416f.).

²² Schelling provides the following account of how he outflanks the *a priori* - *a posteriori*:

for that "compulsion (*Zwang*)" whereby we are compelled to involuntarily believe that "external objects are real" and that "we exist" (I/344/9); questions which, when reformulated into the jargon of philosophy, assume the familiar form: how can I explain the *identity* of subject and object in my knowing?

It is clear that this question will never be resolved as long as we remain captive to the bifurcated world of Kant's form and matter. As we have seen however, Kant himself suggests a different approach to this *aporia* in his analysis of the dynamic category of reciprocity. And the key to understanding Schelling's treatment of this particular issue -- and to thereby grasp the implications of his system as a whole -- lies in the class of categories that according to Kant are dynamic, relational, and have only to do with experience.

The idea of freedom, as the postulate *qua* axis around which his system revolves, provides Schelling with the possibility for the self-determination of the self. To account for this activity of self-determining he must employ the category of reciprocity to explicate how the self can be at one and the same time both determinative and determined, intuiting and intuited, and thereby provide a *dynamic* model of self-consciousness itself. Implicit in Kant's account of this class of category lies the possibility of explicating an identity in duality: if the category of reciprocity accounts for the simultaneous and mutually determinative action among the parts of an organism — that together constitute a unity *qua* whole -- then Schelling has at his disposal a conceptual framework whereby he can account for the mechanism of self-determination *qua*

In that we displace (*versetzen*) the origin of the so-called a priori concepts beyond consciousness, where we also locate the origin of the objective world, we maintain upon the same evidence, and with equal right, that our knowledge is originally empirical through and through, and also through and through *a priori* (I/3 527/151).

Kant, because he starts with the *gemeine Bewußtsein*, simply finds the a priori "so to speak, lying there, and thereby involves" himself "in the insoluble difficulties" which any defender of the *a priori* must wrestle. Schelling continues:

To become aware of our knowledge as *a priori* in character, we have to become aware of the act of producing as such, in abstraction from the product. But in the course of this very operation, we lose from the concept, in the manner deduced above, everything material (all intuition), and nothing save the purely formal can remain (Ibid).

We do have formal concepts, which we can, if we want to confuse ourselves, call a priori concepts; but these concepts do not exist *prior* to experience: they are instead the *product* of "a special exercise of freedom", i.e., of abstraction.

intuition. This will in turn allow him to construct not only an alternative account of the unity of self-consciousness, but indeed a radically different understanding of the nature of that self's existence.

The goal of Schelling's *System of 1800* is "to explain the indestructible connection of the I with a world that is necessarily thought as external to it via a preceding transcendental past of a real or empirical consciousness" -- an explanation that unfolds in what Schelling calls "a transcendental history of the I" (10 93/109). The conception of philosophy that emerges from this standpoint is thus fundamentally historical. Grounded in the *postulate* of the autonomy of the will, both theoretical and practical philosophy have the task of presenting a history of the self in its twofold nature. The object of theoretical philosophy is the history of the unconscious self *qua* nature, whereas the object of practical philosophy is history, both at the species level and at the level of the individual person. The former domain of nature is characterized by unconscious and thus necessary activity, whereas the latter is characterized by self-conscious actions of free, moral agents.

The point at which Schelling locates the identity of subject and object is of course in the self-consciousness of each one of us, for it is only in our self-consciousness that we experience the "feeling of *compulsion*" that accompanies and defines our primordial prejudices about our existence. This unavoidable compulsion of self-consciousness to believe that "I am" is both sustained by, and the product of, the reciprocal interaction of the never-ending *Streit* of the two equaprimal forces that permeate the entire continuum of Nature -- namely those of centrifugal expansion and centripetal contraction -- that Schelling also describes as the infinite *qua* unconscious, and the finite *qua* conscious mind. For as we must never forget when dealing with Schelling: there exists no categorical divide between nature and mind, or between sensible and intelligible. Rather the difference between the two is always only a question of their respective limitations: sensible nature is but unconscious mind, and the conscious mind is but nature elevated to self-consciousness.²³ And yet it is only through the mutual interaction and

²³ "the sensible cannot differ from the supersensible in *kind* but only in respect to its *limitations*" (I/398/100).

restriction of these conflicting directional forces that self-consciousness can emerge. The condition of possibility for self-consciousness is the dynamic and incessant interaction of the opposing forces of what he calls unlimited expansion and a limiting contraction. It is only through such tensive conflict that *factual* restriction and finitude can emerge. Or as Schelling put the matter when he was but twenty years of age:

An activity, for which there is no longer . . . resistance, never returns back into itself. Only through the return into oneself does consciousness emerge. And for us, only a restricted *Realität* is *Wirklichkeit* (I, 324).²⁴

24. At this point I would like to move directly into a substantive presentation of Schelling's conception of the self, time and History. Yet I cannot do this until we have brought out the last, and by far the most important point of contact between Kant and Schelling, namely that of the possibility of self-determination through the moral law. For it is this possibility of self-determination, of an ambidextrous activity of the self in which the self can be both determinative and determined, productive and produced, creator and created, that Schelling will explode and exploit in order to account for the dynamic nature of his model of self-consciousness.

In the second edition Kant closes the *Paralogisms of Pure Reason* with an attempt "to prevent a misunderstanding to which the doctrine of our self-intuition, as appearance, is particularly liable" (B 432). His task is, on the one hand, re-emphasize the impossibility of an intellectual intuition, while simultaneously allowing for a *non-empirical* intuition of an intellectual principle, namely the Idea of freedom and the moral law.

The proposition "I Think" expresses the intuition of the subject as object, that is, the appearance of the object in inner sense. This proposition is equal to the assertion "*I exist thinking*", and as such "determines the subject...in terms of existence" (B 429). If the subject were to be capable of determining "the mode of its existence", it would have to be capable of finding in this intuition "the conditions of the employment of its logical functions" (B 430). If the subject were capable of determining these conditions, it could determine its mode of existence, and thereby "know itself as noumenon" (B 430). But, as we have previously seen, this "is impossible since the inner empirical intuition is sensible and yields only data of appearance"; that is, data which contribute nothing to the knowledge of the object of the self, but can instead only serve as the basis for "obtaining experience" (B 430).

After restating the systemic reasons which preclude the possibility of an intellectual intuition, Kant proceeds to outline how an intellectual intuition of the moral law would fit into his model of the self. At first he couches his words in the subjunctive, but by the end of the passage he freely employs an affirming present tense that leaves no doubt as to the reality of this "marvelous faculty":

Should it be granted that we may in due course discover, not in experience but in certain laws of the pure employment of reason -- laws which are not merely logical rules, but which while holding *a priori* also concern our existence -- grounds for regarding ourselves as *legislating* completely *a priori* in regard to our own *existence*, and as determining this existence, there would thereby be revealed a spontaneity through which our reality would be determinable,

independently of the conditions of empirical intuition (B 430).

Drawing on his earlier discussion of Plato's attempt at an "architectonic ordering" of the world according to the ends of reason -- "an enterprise which calls for respect and imitation" (A 318/B 375) -- Kant writes that access to such laws of the pure employment of reason could only be gained through "a certain inner faculty" which would reveal the existence in our consciousness of an "*a priori*...non-sensible intelligible world" (B 431). He continues:

In this marvelous faculty, which the consciousness of the moral law first reveals to me, I should have, for the determination of my existence, a principle which is purely intellectual (B 431).

And as this marvelous faculty intuits independently of the conditions of empirical intuition, and in intuiting intuits an intellectual principle through which it becomes capable of self-determination: clearly we have here an example of what Kant must call an intellectual intuition. That such is the case is affirmed by Kant in the Second Critique when he refers to this passage and notes:

How this consciousness of the moral laws or...how this consciousness of freedom is possible cannot be further explained; its permissibility, however, is established in the theoretical *Critique* (CPR 46/47).

The consciousness of the moral laws or the Idea of freedom provides the self with a principle with which it can determine its existence and thereby establish its autonomy. In doing so, the self comes to know itself as noumenon. In determining itself *qua* noumenon, the self is conscious of its "existence as a thing in itself" (CPR 98/102), and thus beyond the restrictions of *time*. It is here, in this supersensible realm outside the conditions of time and finitude, in "a world which has true infinity," that Kant locates the domain of his "invisible self, my personality" (CPR 162/169). For contrary to a conception of personality that requires the finite limitations of *individuality*, Kant's framework demands that the self *qua* personality be totally immune to the restrictedness of the finite world. Instead, "the person belonging to the world of sense" can be said to have a personality only to the extent that "he belongs to the intelligible world" (CPR 87/90).

But by what mechanism does the self come to know itself *qua* noumenon? Kant does not provide an account of this and even fails to mention, much less address, how the empirical "person" should relate to its noumenal and "sublime" personality. As noted by Yovell regarding the historical antinomy, Kant here too, in the domain of the individual self, fails to provide a mediating factor that could bridge the gap between the empirical history of a human individual and the atemporal realm of reason.

Schelling himself points to this very problem when he addresses Kant's demand for an empirical psychology, that understands man as subject to the laws of cause and effect causal network, yet does not abandon the idea of freedom, and asks in response:

Why not? *Who* actually does the explaining here? I myself. And *for whom* is an explanation being given? Once again, for myself. What then is this 'I' for whom its acts, although they are *free*, appear as the effects in a necessary chain of cause and effect? (I/398/100).

Schelling goes on to insist, that if we are to make sense of how free acts can appear to us here in the empirical realm, then we must postulate "a higher principle in which reality and possibility, necessity and freedom, the Real and the Ideal are primordially united" (I/398/100). What Schelling asks for here is quite simply: the condition of possibility for a moral world. As to the question whether Kant provides a coherent account of how his theoretical and practical philosophies relate to one another, Schelling expresses doubts "as to whether, in *his* system, they cohere at all" (I/397/99). What Kant should have done, he suggests, was to have concentrated on his idea of autonomy, of the inner idea of freedom, and "it would have become readily apparent that in his system this idea constitutes the axis around which both

The only possible locus for the identity of subject and object is in self-consciousness. What is unconsciously primordial in the self "is the conflict of opposing directions in the self" (I/3 393/45), out of which the mediating factor of self-consciousness emerges, as "*an activity that wavers between opposing directions*" (I/3 393/45). Self-consciousness, as the nodal point of this oscillation, is the dynamic identity generated by this duality. Following Kant, Schelling advances the inner sense *qua* time as the only possible candidate for mediating between these two opposing directions. Just as the inner sense had figured for Kant as both the transcendental *a priori* function of subjectivity in general, and as that "mode in which the mind . . . is affected by itself" (B 68), Schelling now states that "The sole immediate object of transcendental concern is the subjective; the sole organ . . . is therefore *inner sense*" (I/3 350/13).

This use of inner sense enables Schelling to make the seamless transition to the most significant structure of identity found in Kant's first critique, namely that of the transcendental schematism with its promised synthesis of the sensible and the intellectual. For in this instance Kant calls for a mediating "third thing" that, being somehow both similar to and yet different from his two heterogeneous sources of knowledge can nonetheless make possible the application of the categories to appearance. "This mediating representation, . . . in one respect . . . intellectual, in another . . . sensible, . . . is the *transcendental schema*" (A138/B177). The schema however, as "a transcendental product of the imagination," is therewith connected with the inner sense of time, for it is precisely time itself that is capable of such a synthetic function (A142/B181). Accordingly, what "the schematism effects by means of the transcendental synthesis of imagination is nothing other than the unity of all the manifold of intuition in inner sense" (A145B/184). It is in this ambidextrous character of imagination and inner sense that

theoretical and practical philosophy revolve" (I/397/99). Quoting Kant's own words from his treatise *Von einem neuerdings erhabenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie*, "what Archimedes was in need of yet did not find: a firm standpoint where reason can apply its lever, not to the present or some future world but strictly to the *inner idea of freedom*" (1 401, 102). Schelling finds in this idea of the freedom of the will the condition of possibility for a moral world, and as such, he employs this idea as the common postulate for his system of philosophy, a system that encompasses and unites both theoretical and practical philosophies.

Schelling locates the power to produce identity from duality, and to construct his conception of the self:

Transcendental philosophy proceeds . . . from a free act, and such an act can only be postulated . . . If the principle of philosophy is a postulate, the object of this postulate will be the most primordial construction for *inner sense*, i.e., for the *self* . . . as the producing of itself (I/3 371/28f).

From this it follows that it is impossible for the self to be "a thing or *eine Sache*" (I/3 367/26). It is "indeed an object, but only *für sich*" not *an sich*, "and is thus not *originally* in the world of objects; it first *becomes* an object by making itself into an object" (I/3 367/26). The self *für sich* as object can be nothing other than the "very knowledge of itself", for it is only in this knowledge of itself that the self first comes into being (I/3 368/27). Schelling sees this as proving that the being of the self is knowing, "that its knowing is a form of being" (I/3 570/185). It then follows that there is no *substrate* of the self independent of its active knowing (I/3 529/153). In short, the self is at once both activity and reflection, and as such is itself an intellectual intuition. Consequently, intellectual intuition as constitutive of the self shares duty with the inner sense as "the organ of all transcendental thinking" (I/3 369/27).

These three capacities of inner sense, productive imagination, and intellectual intuition constitute the central characters of Schelling's *System* that he employs to derive from the principle of the self all our knowledge of the "objective world, with all its determinations" and "history" (I/3 378/35). The method he employs to this end is a dialectic, the dynamics of which follow from the second premise of his deduction of self-consciousness, namely, that "*self-consciousness . . . is a conflict of absolutely opposed activities*" (I/3 397/49). He explains his procedure as follows:

Two opposites *a* and *b* (subject and object) are united by the act *x*, but *x* contains a new opposition, *c* and *d* (sensing and sensed), and so the act *x* itself again becomes an object; it is itself explicable only through a new act = *z*, which perhaps again contains an opposition, and so on (I/3 411/61).

Following this paradigm of a dynamically progressive movement, each member of an opposition

mutually presupposes and reciprocally conditions the other. With each cycle of the dialectic, an "original duplicity within the identity . . . unfold[s]" itself as the "objective element" that enters the consciousness of the self. For "it is only that original identity in the duality which brings unification and connection into all synthetic knowledge" (I/3 374/31). Each stage in the progressive elevation of the self from one level of intuition to the next is propelled by the variance wrought by that specific polarity. The first phased cycle finds infinitude and finitude suspended in the tensive field of mutual restriction, with the outcome that *restrictedness* becomes the condition "*under which alone the self as self can be infinite*" (I/3 383/39). From there we move to the field of the *real* and the *ideal*, in which both activities mutually presuppose the other, and from which "the entire mechanism of the self will have to be derived" (I/3 386/41). Just as these two activities "reciprocally presuppose each other, so also do *idealism* and *realism*" (I/3 386/41). And it is the activity that arises from the union of this polarity which Schelling terms "*ideal-realism*," the true description of the philosophy propagated by his system (I/3 386/41).²⁵

To account for the reality of our experience of both self and world, Schelling must first address the object of theoretical philosophy, which is none other than the history of the unconscious self *qua* nature. The first epoch of this history must account for how the self comes to intuit itself as limited, which is to say, it must account for the fact of our primordial sensation

²⁵ At the beginning of his *System of 1800*, Schelling provides the following characterization of his philosophy in contrast to Fichte's:

The most general proof of the overall ideality of knowledge is therefore carried out in the *Science of Knowledge*, by immediate inference from the proposition *I am*. There is yet another proof of its possibility, however, namely the factual (*faktische*), which in a *system of transcendental idealism* is carried out in the very process of actually deducing the entire system of knowledge from the principle in question (I/3 377/34).

The contrast between the ideality of Fichte's Philosophy and the *faktische* dimension of his own, provides us with an example of how fundamental the category of reciprocity is for Schelling's thinking. For he does not merely present an exclusively factual account of Fichte's ideal system, but he instead present an "ideal-realism" that can only emerge from the "*Wechselwirkung*" of both the real and the ideal. And indeed, it is only through the *Wirklichkeit* generated by such a dynamic interaction of opposing forces that Schelling can feel justified in claiming that his system provides *in fact* what Fichte's can only provide *ideally* (difference between philosophy of nature and transcendental idealism).

qua productive intuition of an external world of objects. This sensing is by its nature blind and unconscious, and represents but the most dulled and diffuse potentiation of the powers of intuition.²⁶

Transcendentally regarded, the sensory object is nothing other than outer intuition itself, cut off from the self. What Schelling must provide is an account of the process whereby this outer intuition becomes separated from the unconsciously productive self. To do this, he must further define the nature of the boundary that "cuts off" the self from the objective reality of an object whose production the self is ultimately responsible for. For what he seeks is an account of the primordial limitation of the self that will provide for the compulsion that accompanies all true cognition; that is, Schelling must account for a Not-I that can provide for the *faktische* firstness of experience that eluded Fichte's Not-I. The reality of his proposed limitation, Schelling notes, will "only demolish an idealism which sought to bring forth the original limitation freely and with consciousness" -- that is, Fichte's -- "whereas the transcendental version" -- Schelling's version -- "leaves us as little freedom in that regard as even the realist could desire" (I/3 408/58).²⁷

How Schelling achieves this is through the use of the limiting factors of time and the unconscious. First let us consider his account of the role of time:

The reason why the self finds itself limited in this action cannot lie in the present action, but rather in one that is *past*. So the self in its present action is limited *without* its

²⁶ It is a common misunderstanding of Schelling's philosophy, to construe his concept of "intellectual intuition" as somehow being a form of knowing that lays claim to "*Erkenntnis*" proper. This is not the case. The intuition of which he presently speaks, is a *productive intuition*, which is but the preconscious condition for conscious knowing: "Intuition does not yet involve any consciousness, though without it, consciousness is not even possible" (I/369/80). Intuition delimits nothing other than the productive power of the imagination. Or as Hegel himself pointed out in his earliest writings: "the idea of this...intuitive understanding...at bottom is nothing other than the idea of the transcendental faculty of imagination" (*Jenaer Schriften*, (1972), s.162).

²⁷ Schelling's most succinct and damning criticism of Fichte's subjective Idealism appears in his work of 1806, *Exhibition of the true relation of the philosophy of nature to the improved Fichtean doctrine*: ...In the last analysis what is the essence of his [Fichte's] whole opinion of nature? It is this: that nature should be used...and that it is there for nothing more than to be used; his principal, according to which he looks at nature, is the economic-teleological principle (I/7 17).

consent, but that it finds itself so limited is also the whole of what is contained in sensation, and is the condition of all objectivity in knowledge (I/3 409/58)

What allows Schelling to make this distinction of a *qualitative* difference between a past and present state of the self is his use of the unconscious. For it is this power of the involuntary, of a *limbic necessity*, that enables him to account for how the ground of the self's limitation emerges from within that self, yet will only appear to the conscious mind as subsisting external to it.

Schelling writes:

So in order that the limitation shall appear to us as a thing independent of ourselves, provision is made for this purpose, through the mechanism of sensation, that the act whereby all limitation is posited, as the condition of all consciousness, does not itself come to consciousness (I/3 409/58).

The boundary that limits the activity of the object can only be explained by a ground external to both its nature and the nature of the self; this ground must lie somewhere "wholly outside consciousness," but yet still be capable of intervening "in the present phase of consciousness" (I/3 463/101). In striving to overcome this boundary,²⁸ the self discovers that the ground of this restriction lies in a state of consciousness beyond the present one, namely, one that is behind it and thus in the past. In its incapacity to return to this past state of consciousness, the self "*feels*" itself restrained and experiences "a state of constraint" (I/3 464/102). This "feeling of being thus driven back to a stage that it cannot in reality return to" generates "the feeling of the *present*" (I/3 465/103). The genesis of self as distinct from object thus springs from the feeling of being "trapped in a present," of being "held fast in a particular moment of the time series" (I/3 481/115). All consciousness begins with this feeling, and with it, the empirical self first becomes aware of external objects. In this moment of restriction the self "becomes an object to itself *as* pure intensity, as activity that can extend itself only in one dimension, but is at present concentrated at a single point" (I/3 465/103). And it is this constricted activity of the self, of its

²⁸ Because of its primordial drive for expansion and the infinite, the self, when faced with a limit, is compelled to discover its ground; thus it attempts to overstep this boundary and seek that which no longer lies within consciousness.

becoming an object to itself, that brings forth our awareness of time as limit. From this it is clear that for Schelling time is no longer merely a formal condition of intuition, but has rather become *constitutive* of the empirical self, for as he points out, "Time is not something that flows independently of the self; the self itself is time conceived of in activity (I/3 465/103).

In an inversion of Kant's determination of a temporality defined by the formal requirements of a transcendental apperception, Schelling here presents a self whose consciousness emerges from the restrictive influence of time, and is thus subordinate to and limited by its temporal restraints. This conception of time goes beyond the quantitative mode of a time conceived as parallel to number, and instead advances time as an irreversible restraint and limit to the empirical self, thereby establishing the possibility for a *faktische*, a real *historical time* that designates a *qualitative* and material difference, between a past and present moment.²⁹ Schelling incorporates this restrictive time as a limit that defines the qualities of objective objects, and thus of determinateness, when he writes that ". . . a magnitude in time we call *quality*," and "only by virtue of its quality does any given object become something determinate" (I/381/89). And it is this qualitative *Bestimmtheit* that in turn defines what it means to be human: "The original limitation, which we have in common with all rational beings, consists in the fact of our intrinsic finitude" (I/3 409/59). The *Wirklichkeit* of Schelling's time results from the fact that, seen "from the standpoint of intuition, . . . time appertains at once both to inner and outer sense" (I/3 517/143). For at this *epoch* in the genetic development of the preconscious self, time is "an object of outer sense" and thus still material (I/3 517/143).

The only way Schelling can account for the productive activity of intuition has been through the use of Kant's categories of relation. Unlike Kant however, Schelling actually attempts a *new deduction* of the categories, so that they will remain consistent with his system of real-idealism. Now because Kant defined relation as the sole content of all intuition in the first critique, and because time *qua* intuition is the organ of Schelling's system, it follows that Schelling must derive the one class of category that "underlies" all other classes from this

²⁹ Is there an opening for reciprocity in the interaction of the past-present-future? Do they constitute a whole? Mutually determining one another?

"original intuition of time" (I/3 515/141), a class of categories that can only be those of relation.

As I briefly mentioned earlier, it is precisely Kant's analysis of the category of community or reciprocity that provides Schelling with the possibility of conceiving self-consciousness in *triadic* fashion: as an unceasing activity produced by a duality, whose producing is in turn an identity *qua whole*. For to speak of a duality within an identity *qua whole* would appear to be permitted by Kant's distinction that the category of reciprocity only applies to "a *whole* which is made up" of individual members; a whole whose members relate to each not as a ground to a successive consequent, but as equal members of a relation in which neither is subordinated to the other; a relational community -- or as Schelling calls it, "a co-existence" -- in which both "simultaneously and reciprocally" co-ordinate each other, in that each is simultaneously "the cause of the determination of the other."

Yet the triadic relation among this class of categories is essentially different from the relation advanced by Kant. Whereas Kant held that the third member of each class "always arises from the combination of the second category with the first" (B 110), Schelling maintains that the first two categories "are possible only mutually through one another, that is, they are possible only in a third, which is reciprocity" (I/3 520/ 146).³⁰ The interrelation among the three is such that only through the addition of the third member are the previous two possible. The triad cannot be reduced to a "dyadic subject-object relation."³¹ For the first two alone are purely ideal; only through the third category do they become real, because it is through the third category that the previous two acquire the transcendental schematism of time (I/3 447/112). Thus the condition for the possibility of the first category of the class of relation, is the third member of that class, *reciprocity*. The first two members, substance and causality, are only possible in that they "mutually presuppose the other" (I/3 522/147), which is to say that they can exist only in a *reciprocal* relation with each other. The first category of substance and accident is only intuited through the second category, that is, through the category of causality. But both are possible only in that "we add the transcendental schema of time" (I/3 520/146):

³⁰ Structural necessity of futurity is being pulled towards the condition of possibility of identity.

³¹ Apel on Pierce, *From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism*, 122.

Substance is intuitable as such only by being intuited as persisting in time, but it cannot be intuited as persistent unless time, which has so far designated only the absolute boundary, flows (extends itself in one dimension), which in fact comes about only through the succession of the causal sequence. But conversely, too, that any succession occurs in time is intuitable only in contrast to something that persists therein, or, since time arrested in its flow = space, [time arrested in its flow is then] that [which] persists in space, and this in fact is substance. Hence these two categories are possible only mutually through one another, that is, they are possible only in a third, which is reciprocity (I/3 520/146).³²

Consequently, in every class of category, the relation between the first two categories is always similar to that obtaining between space and time, and the second category in every class is necessary to append the transcendental schema of time to the first category of each class. Significant however, is the fact that for Schelling the mathematical categories can only arise from the standpoint of reflection, such that each of these categories, in their exclusive employment of reflection, "abolish . . . the unity of inner and outer sense"(I/3 520/146) -- that is, they abolish constitutive time -- and it is only if time is reintroduced into these categories through the category of reciprocity, that this unity can be restored. It then follows that Schelling must derive the category of substance and accident from our intuition of space and time: from the intuition of time *qua* succession he derives the category of cause and effect, and from the intuition of *organic nature*, he derives the category of reciprocity.

In closing I would just like to provide some examples of how Schelling's theoretical considerations of unconscious nature manifest themselves in his practical philosophy of conscious mind.

Time and individuality arise for the self in its act of free self-determination. With the autonomous act of the self, Schelling leaves the domain of theoretical philosophy and enters the realm of the practical, that is, of the experience of self-consciousness *für sich*. Thus whereas the object of theoretical philosophy is the activity of the self prior to consciousness, that is, Nature,

³² Being in our system is freedom suspended (I/3 376/33).

the object of practical philosophy is the autonomous activity of the *will*, whose field of performance is none other than that of experience *qua* history.³³

The problematic of freedom and necessity -- following the formal dynamics of infinitude and finitude, unlimited and limited -- appears in Schelling's discussion of time and its determinative role in our lives. For example, the particular succession of time into which one is "thrown and posited" ("*hingeworfen und gestetzt*") is not something that one's will has any control over; it is rather something that happens to you (I/3 485/118). As a condition of restrictedness, the time which one becomes aware of in the act of self-knowledge "is not determined by you, insofar as you are this individual, for to that extent you are not the producer, but you yourself belong to the product" (I/3 484/117).³⁴ It is time, as that force which provides for the possibility of a past, that determines your individuality.

For if we were to take away this original restrictedness, time and all individuality would dissolve into an absolute intelligence which remains "unaware of itself as such" (I/3 484/117). The boundary that separates absolute intelligence and conscious intelligence is therefore restrictedness, finitude, and time. Schelling writes:

For pure reason there is no time, for it *is* everything, and everything at once; for reason insofar as it is empirical, everything comes into being, and what arises for it is all merely successive (I/3 485/117).³⁵

Considered from the standpoint of temporality, the absolute intelligence encompasses everything

³³ As Schelling put the matter in 1797: "In respect of their *object*, philosophy and experience have been opposed to each other (as even the name metaphysics indicates). *This* opposition disappears. The object of philosophy is the *wirkliche Welt*" (1 464).

³⁴ As a particular intelligence, it is necessary that you perceive this succession into which you have been "pitched and posited" (I/3 485/118) as itself necessary. It must appear as a "predetermined series independent of yourself," which you lack the power to create in any other way than the one in which you experience it. For your entire awareness of yourself as an individual depends on this: "for what lies beyond your consciousness should appear to you as independent of yourself, is precisely what constitutes your particular limitation. Take this way, and there is no past; posit the latter, and it is just as necessary and just as real -- no more, that is, and no less -- as the limitation" (I/3 484/117)

³⁵ But only in reciprocal action with the absolute self - if the absolute self were cut away from the finite self, the restrictedness would cease, the restrictive intensity of time would cease, and the finite self would dissipate into an unrestricted and infinite extension of space.

that was, is and will be. But that this absolute intelligence may become some thing, "that is, become a determinate" and individual intelligence, it must submit to the restriction of time, which will produce "an empirical infinitude engendered through succession of presentations" (I/3 487/120). The empirical self has the continuous "feeling" of being restricted, a feeling that is *provoked* by time, yet simultaneously *sustained* by the self's awareness of the infinite. As our entire existence depends on activity, our existence must find its expression in continuous productivity. There is a "*necessary* striving to sustain the continuity of the representations, that is, an *eternal producing*," in which the self moves from a past and "inevitably aims at something in the future" (I/3 384/91). But at what does the self aim at in the future?

The answer of course lies in the imagination. Echoing previous accounts of this faculty advanced by Kant and Fichte,³⁶ Schelling provides an account of how, as a result of the opposition generated by the infinity of freedom and the "finitude" of our temporal existence (I/3 558/176), "an activity must arise which wavers in the middle between finitude and infinity"; an activity which mediates "between the theoretical and the practical" projects of reason; an activity which he terms "imagination." The power generated by such a polarity must of necessity produce something, "which itself oscillates between infinity and finitude," (I/3 558/176). The products of such an oscillation he terms "Ideas" and opposes them to "concepts." This state of productive imagining he terms "reason," and opposes it to "understanding." Conversely, what is commonly called reason is within Schelling's *System* "nothing else but imagination in the service of freedom" (I/3 559/176). Thus where the reflexive activities of the understanding fail to provide a mechanism whereby the self could visualize how the moral law

³⁶ Kant, *Third Critique*, #49; Fichte, *Wissenschaftslehre*. Schelling himself writes in the *Treatise*: "from the reciprocal interplay of the opposing activities of space and time, there emerges a third, communal one...this spontaneous activity of the spirit that is operative in intuition, Kant justly ascribes to the *imagination* because this faculty...is the only one capable of exhibiting in one communal product the negative and positive activities" (I/1 357/72).

should be realized in the future, the self must rely on the productive powers of the imagination to create and *bring forth* possibilities of how the future should be. The self is led by this process into "a new realm, into the realm of the creative and realizing activity of reason" which Schelling earlier described as follows:

What lies beyond the real world are the *Ideas*, i.e., not as objects of speculation but of action, to that extent therefore of a *future* experience (but nonetheless still of experience), something that should be realized in reality (I/1 465).

In conclusion, let us return to our original question: what principle of individuation does Schelling advance to mediate between the sensible and supersensible? A principle that would enable us to coherently speak of a particular moral agent who strives to realize the demands of the moral law?

To provide but a formal reply to this question, we could answer that Schelling's use of the category of reciprocity offers an intelligible way to speak of -- among other things -- a possible mediation of reason embodied in actual time. To advance a more substantive candidate, we could suggest that, as we just saw, it is indeed the power of imagination that serves as mediator. For according to Schelling, imagination itself is that "productive power whereby" in its primordial potentiality it brings forth the object world and yet is "likewise the source from which" in its highest potentiation, brings forth the work of art (I/3 626/230). And as imagination derives its power from the very fact that it "oscillates between infinity and finitude," it would appear that this faculty must be the agent of mediation. But such cannot be the case, for what is the condition of possibility of imagination's "oscillation" but movement effected within a succession in time? Consequently, it appears that not only is time the mother of all development -- or that everything that is, is a function of time -- but that only time construed as "the universal

mediator" has the capacity to "sublate" a contradiction (I/3 563/178). But whether or not time can actually serve as such a mediator remains an open question. And this is precisely the purpose of a *System of Philosophy*, as advanced by Schelling in the Forward to *his* System:

And by this, indeed, such a system finds the surest touchstone of its truth, that it not only provides a ready solution to problems hitherto insoluble, but actually generates entirely new problems, never before considered, and by a general shattering of received opinion gives rise to a new sort of truth (I/3 330/1).